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What will an appreciation of China’s currency do to inward and outward FDI? 
by 
Karl P. Sauvant and Ken Davies* 
 
What will an appreciation of the Chinese yuan do to China’s inward and outward direct 
investment? The discussion so far has been almost exclusively about the impact on 
China’s trade balance. But it is at least as important to see what effect it may have on the 
country’s inward foreign direct investment (IFDI), which plays such a crucial role in 
China’s economic development, and its outward FDI (OFDI), which is receiving 
increased attention worldwide.1 
 
China has been the developing world’s largest recipient of IFDI since the mid-1990s, 
attracting US$95 billion in 2009.2 A revaluation of the yuan will make it more expensive 
for foreign firms to establish themselves (or expand) in China (the world’s most dynamic 
market), giving an advantage to foreign firms already established there over new entrants. 
At the same time, exports of foreign affiliates, which account for 54% of total exports,3 
will become less competitive internationally, although the increased costs will be partly 
offset by lower costs of imported inputs. Foreign affiliates can also expect to repatriate 
higher profits from sales in China in terms of their own currencies.  
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However, the most notable development of recent years has been the take-off of the 
country’s OFDI since the government in 2000 adopted the “go global” policy 
encouraging Chinese firms to invest overseas.4 China’s OFDI doubled from US$12 
billion in 20055 to US$27 billion in 2007, and then doubled again the following year, to 
reach US$56 billion.6 Outflows continued to rise to $57 billion in 2009, even as world 
FDI flows collapsed by 50%. In 2009, China was the world’s fifth largest outward 
investor.  
 
The increasing international competitiveness of Chinese firms and an encouraging 
government policy have been the main drivers of this surge. The 20% revaluation of 
China’s currency against the US dollar in 2005-2008 undoubtedly provided a favorable 
condition facilitating this in the case of host countries whose currencies did not also 
appreciate against the US dollar. There is ample evidence in the academic literature that a 
weaker exchange rate induces increased IFDI.7 
  
China’s OFDI is poised to grow sharply again in 2010, judging by the first half of the 
year, when it was rising at an annual rate of 44%.8 Revaluation would accelerate this 
trend. This is precisely what happened with Japan after the yen was revalued by over 
50% against the US dollar between 1985 and 1987, following the 2005 Plaza Accord.9 
Japan’s OFDI tippled from US$6.5 billion in 1984 to US$19.5 billion in 1986, peaking at 
US$48 billion in 1990.10 
 
A renewed yuan appreciation would boost China’s OFDI growth even further by 
lowering the cost of overseas assets for Chinese firms, which have strong cash reserves 
from both retained earnings and large-scale state credit allocations that put them in a 
position to invest internationally. Like competitors elsewhere, they need to invest abroad 
to acquire a portfolio of locational assets to protect and increase their international 
competitiveness through better access to skills, technology, natural resources, and 
markets.  
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Revaluation would combine with already rising wage pressures inside China. Labor-
intensive firms in China’s coastal provinces are under pressure to seek lower labor cost 
by either investing in China’s interior of abroad. Already more than 700 Chinese 
affiliates have been established in Vietnam.11  Revaluation would push even more in that 
direction. 
 
Suspicions of non-commercial motivations behind China’s OFDI are widespread because 
most of the country’s OFDI is by state-owned enterprises (SOEs). However, there is no 
systematic evidence that China’s SOEs, like their counterparts elsewhere, are driven by 
more than normal commercial considerations. At the same time, private or semi-private 
entities have been investing abroad. As their operations are less visible, it is likely that 
their OFDI, and therefore China’s total OFDI, is understated. 
 
Fears of Chinese OFDI, as of Japanese and Korean investment in earlier decades, are 
misplaced. It is good for China and for host countries: Chinese FDI, like all FDI, can 
bring to host countries a bundle of tangible and intangible assets needed for economic 
growth and development. While a good part of China’s OFDI initially takes the form of 
trade-supporting FDI, it can be expected to lead relatively quickly to a shift of some 
production out of China, including to the US and Europe, thereby reducing exports from 
China. Moreover, OFDI is a key mechanism for integrating China into the world 
economy and making it a responsible stakeholder in it. 
 
However, Chinese firms will have to learn from the past mistakes of other emerging 
multinationals about how to operate in the highly sophisticated developed-country 
markets and in developing countries. They need not only to overcome the “liability of 
foreignness” that any multinational faces when establishing itself in a foreign market, but 
they also need to overcome the “liability of the home country”. In particular, they need to 
establish a good social brand name so that they are seen as making not only a positive 
economic contribution to their host countries, but are also seen as good corporate 
citizens. The Chinese government can play a crucial role by adopting a code of conduct 
for all Chinese enterprises investing abroad, in line with internationally accepted norms 
and taking into account the increasing importance of sustainable FDI. For their part, host 
countries need to accept the “new kids on the block” and not discriminate against Chinese 
investment, nor establish protectionist barriers against it. 
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